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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OIF UTAH
GENE WHEADON and
DEANE WHEADON, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs.-

Case
No. 9696

GEORGE B. PEARSON and
SARAH K. PEARSON, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by which plaintiffs seek to establish the existence of a permanent easement or right-ofway across defendants' land.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint, on
motion of defendants, on the ground of res judicata.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the lower court's order of
dismissal.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
There are two suits involved in this appeal, both of
which were filed in the District Court for Salt Lake
County. In the first suit, No. 129450, plaintiffs, through
other counsel, sued defendants for the purpose of establishing the existence of a permanent easement, a ppurtenant to plaintiffs' land, across defendants' land. The
complaint in the first suit (the record in the first suit was
not serially numbered by the lower court) sets forth
plaintiffs' cause of action for establishment of the said
right-of-way on the theory of adverse user over a period
in excess of twenty years (paragraph 3). At the pretrial hearing, the lower court found that plaintiff Gene
Wheadon was the owner of both plaintiffs' and defendants' parcels for a five-year period within the period of
claimed adverse use, and concluded that there was not a
sufficient period of adverse use aside from the said fiveyear period to establish plaintiffs' claim. Upon motion
of defendants' counsel, it therefore granted summary
judgment against plaintiffs (see pre-trial order).
Present counsel then filed in plaintiffs' behalf a motion for new trial with affidavits in support thereof, and
the matter was argued by respective counsel to the trial
court. The trial court denied the motion, and the present
suit was commenced shortly thereafter.

In this second suit, No. 136131, plaintiffs again seek
to establish a permanent easement appurtenant to their
land across defendants' land, but on an entirely different cause of action. The present complaint (R. 1) sets
forth a cause of action based on an implied e·asement

2
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brought into being at the division of a parcel of land
into two contiguous parcels, one of which was burdened
during the single ownership by a right-of-way for the
benefit of the other. Defendants' counsel moved to dismiss the present complaint on the ground that the issues
involved were res judicata by reason of the summary
judgment in the first suit. The· trial court granted that
motion.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT ON THE
GROUND OF RES JUDICATA.
The general rule is stated in 30-A American Jurisprudence Judgments, section 363, to the effect that a
final judgment on the merits is a bar to a later action by
the same parties involving the· same claim, demand, and
cause of action. That text then continues (p. 403):
If, however, the two suits do not involve the same
claim, demand, and cause of action, such effect
will not be ordinarily given to the prior judgment.
In this respect, it is worthy of notice that there
must be not only identity of subject matter, but
also of the cause of action, so that a judgment in
a former action does not operate as a bar to a
subsequent action where the cause of action is not
the same, although each action relates to the
same subject matter ....
Further statement of the rule is set forth in section 373
of the same work :
The rule granting conclusiveness to a judgment
in regard to issues of fact which could prope·rly
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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have been determined in the action is generally
limited to cases inYolYing the- samL' eanse of action.
Where a second action is upon a different claim,
demand, or cause of action, the established rule is
that the judgment in the first action operates as
an estoppel only as to the points or questions
actually litigated and determined, and not as to
matters not litigated in the former action, even
though such matters might properly have been
determined therein. Accordingly, the view is gPnerally taken that before the clortrine of res judicata is applied in such cases, it should appear that
the precise question involved in the subsequent
action was determined in the former action. rrhese
rules prevail whether the judgment is used in
pleading as a technical estoppel, or is relied on by
way of evidence as conclusive per se.
The author at 50 Corpus Jurus Secundum, Judgments,
section 648, p. 82, states the rule similarly:
Although a judgment may be conclusive evidence
on any point formerly litigated and decided between the same parties, ... yet it is not pleadable
in bar of a second action unless it is founded on
the same identical of substantially identical cause
of action, notwithstanding the parties are the
same, the circumstances comparable, and the defense similar, or the same property is involved. In
applying this rule, numerous particular cases have
adjudicated the lack of identity of causes of action
as against the claim of res judicata. On the other
hand, where the requisite identity of causes of
action is shown to exist, the former judgment may
be interposed to prevent a second recovery by
plaintiff on the same cause, or to bar the maintenance of a second action on a cause against which
defendant has already successfully defended himself, and a party cannot evade the rule by changing
4
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the form of his complaint. It must clearly appear
or be demonstated on what cause of action the former judgment was rendered and that it is the same
as the cause of action brought forward in the second suit; and no estoppel arises if this matter can
be made only inference or conjecture. Any doubt
as to the identity of the causes of action in the two
suits must be resolved in favor of the party against
whom the plea of res judicata is asserted.
And again, from section 652 of the same work at p. 97 :
... However, identity of the subject matter is not
alone a sufficient test; the true requirement is that
the causes of action in the two suits shall be the
same. Undoubtedly the subject matter involved
in the two actions must be the same, for otherwise there could not be an identity of the causes of
action; but the same transaction or state of facts
may give rise to distinct or successive causes of
action, and the judgment on one will not bar a
suit on another, . . . Therefore, a judgment in a
former suit, although between the same parties
and relating to the same subject matter, is not a
bar to a subsequent action, when the cause of
action is not the same. . ..
Under the comment to section 63 of the Restatement,
Judgments, the same rule is explained in the rationale :
Where the plaintiff has brought an action and
judgment has been rendered against him on the
merits, and thereafter he brings a new action
against the defendant, it is important to determine
whether the new action is based on the same or a
different cause of action. If the action is based on
the same cause of action, the plaintiff is barred by
the prior judgment, regardless of the issues which
were litigated on the prior action. On the other

5
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hand, if the new action is based on a different cause
of action, the judgment is conclusive only as to
questions actually litigated and determined in the
prior action.
This court has previously am1ounced the same rule.
In Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena 1llining eu., 77
U. 362, 296 P. 231 (1931), this court approved the rule
from 15 R. C. L. 977 set forth in respondent's brief in
that case, that ''a judgment concludes the parties only as
to the facts actually decided, or which were necessarily
involved in it and without the existence of which such
judgment could not have been rendered, and is not conclusive as to matters not litigated or material to recovery
in the former suit.'' More recently, in Ea.st Mill Creel.·
Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 108 U. 315, 159 P. 2d 863
(1945), this court rejected the defendant's claim of res
judicata and stated, " ... On the other hand, where the
claim, demand, or cause of action is different in the two
cases then the former is res judicata. of the latter only to
the extent that the former actually raised and decided the
same points and issues which are raised in the latter.''
The court then cited a number of decisions in support of
the rule, including the Glen Allen case, quoted from above.
The decision in Voyles, et al. v. Straka, 77 U. 171, 292 P.
913 ( 1930) is to the same effect, the court there quoting
from 34 C. J. 874 with approval.
The question then becomes one of determining
whether the causes of action involved in the two suits are
identical or whether they are separate or distinct. Amer-

6
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ican Jurisprudence, Judgments, Vol. 30-A, section 365,
states the test as follows:
In the application of the doctrine of res judicata, if
it is doubtful whether a second action is for the
same cause of action as the first, the test generally
applied is to consider the identity of facts essential
to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence
would sustain both. If the same, facts or evidence
would sustain both, the two actions are considered
the same within the rule that the judgment in the
former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions rest upon different states
of facts, or if different proofs would be, required
to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no
bar to the maintenance of the other. It has been
said that this method is the best and most accurate
test as to whether a former judgment is a bar in
subsequent proceedings between the same parties,
and it has even been designated as infallible. On
the other hand, it has been declared that the mere
fact that the same evidence may be admissible under the pleadings in each action is not necessarily
controlling. It has also been held that the maintenance of the second action may be precluded
even though different grounds for relief are interposed. It is clear that the identity of causes of
action may not be determined by the test whether
the claims might have been joined in a single
action.
The same rule is stated in 50 Corpus J urus Secundum,
Judgments, section 648~ at p. 88:
A "cause of action" for the purpose of applying
the doctrine of res judicata is the fact or facts
which establish or give rise to a right of action,
the existence of which affords a party a right to
judicial relief. The number and variety of the facts
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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alleged do not constitutl' more than 01H' <'a llHP of
action as long as their result, "·hether tlwy hl' eonsidered severally or in combination, iH the \'iolation of but one right by a singlP lPgal wrong. In
determining whether causes of net ion an· idPntical
so as to warrant application of the rule of 1'<'H
judicata, the test most commonly stntl'd is to HH<'<'1'tain whether the same evidPnre which iR neceHHa ry
to sustain the second action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first; if so the
prior judgment is a bar; otherwise it is not. If,
however, the evidence offered in the second suit iR
sufficient to authorize a recovery, but could not
have produced a different result in the first suit,
the failure of plaintiff in the first suit is no bar to
his recovery in the other suit, although it is for
the same cause- of action. It has been held that a
proper test on an issue of identity of causes of
action is to inquire whe-ther the judgment sought
will be inconsistent with the prior judgment; if
such inconsistency is not shown, the prior judgment is not a bar....
The Restatement, Judgments, at section 61, states the
same rule : ''Where a judgment is rendered in favor of the
plaintiff or where- a judgment on the merits is rendered
in favor of the defendant the plaintiff is precluded from
subsequently maintaining a second action based upon the
same transaction, if the evidence needed to sustain the
second action would have sustained the first action.''
To summarize the foregoing authorities, the rule is
that if the evidence necessary to sustain the second action
would not have sustained the first, then res judicata is
not a bar.

8
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If the rule were otherwise, a plaintiff who proceeded
on the wrong theory and thereby lost would be forever
foreclosed from recovery, no matter how just his cause.
That he is not so precluded is shown in the following
statements of the correct rule, first from 50 Corpus J urus
Secundum Judgments, section 649, at p. 90: "Where
plaintiff is defe·ated in an action based on a certain
theory of his legal rights or as to the legal effects of a
given transaction or state of facts through failure to substantiate his view of the case, this will not as a rule preclude him from renewing the litigation ... on a new and
more correct theory.... " And again, from the Restatement, Judgments, section 65, comment on sub-section (2)h.:
Where, as at common law, the plaintiff in an action
at law has to select a particular form of action,
and judgment is given for the defendant on the
ground that the plaintiff has brought the wrong
form of action, the judgment is not on the merits,
and the plaintiff is not precluded from subsequently maintaining an action in the proper form
of action. Thus, if the plaintiff brought an action
of covenant alleging that the defendant made a
promise under seal but it was shown at the trial
that the promise was not under seal and verdict
and judgment were for this reason given for the
defendant, the plaintiff is not precluded by the
judgment from maintaining an action of assumpsit. Conversely, where the plaintiff brought an
action of assumpsit and it was shown that the
promise sued upon was under seal, and judgment
was accordingly given the defendant, the plaintiff
is not precluded from maintaining an action in covenant. So also, where judgment was given for the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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defendant in an action of trespass on the ground
that case was the proper form of action, the plaintiff is not precluded from maintaining an action
on the case.
Where the forms of action have been abolished, a
similar question may arise. Where the plajntiff
in his complajnt bases his right of action on one
theory, it is held in some States that he iR not entitled to recover on a different theory, even though
he has alleged facts in his complaint sufficient to
entitle him to recover on another theory and those
facts are admitted or proved at the trial. If judgment is given for the defendant on this ground,
the plaintiff is not precluded from subsequently
maintaining an action on the other theory.
The complaints involved in the two suits in question
here, might now be examined against the background of
the legal principles discussed above. In the first suit, the
gist of the cause of action is contained in paragraph 3
of the complaint. It states:
Along the East Jordan Canal bank, there has been
a lane or road about fifteen or twenty feet in width
which is now, and for more than thirty years has
been, used by the plaintiffs, their grantors and
predecessors in interest and by divers other persons as a vehicular and pedestrian road to gain
ingress and egress to and from the above described
real property of plaintiff and to other real property located by plaintiffs' land, under claim of
right of user, and plaintiffs and others have notoriously and openly used said lane and road
under said right for more than thirty years, which
lane and road extends from a country road, 13800
South, along the canal to the plaintiff's property.
10
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If the plaintiffs have the-re set forth any ground upon
which the court could grant them an easement over defendants' land, it is on the theory of adverse use in excess
of twenty years, or in other words, on a prescriptive right
cause of action (2 American Law of Property, sections
8.44-8.63, 2 Thompson, Real Property [1961 replacement],
sections 335-350).
The pertinent portions of the complaint in the second
suit are contained in paragraphs 4 through 9 (R. 2-3)
and are of such length that to quote them verbatim would
unduly extend this brief. In summary, they allege that
the parties' respective parcels were previously held in
single ownership, that while so held defendants' parcel
was used for the benefit of plaintiffs' parcel, that such
use continued for a long period and was of a visible,
apparent, continuous and permanent nature, that the
single parcel was seve·red into the two contiguous parcels
now owned by the parties, and that the continued use of
defendants' parcel by plaintiffs is necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of plaintiffs' land.
The latter complaint thus sets forth plaintiffs' right
to an easement over defendants' land on an implied easement theory (2 American Law of Property, sections 8.318.43, 2 Thompson, Real Property [1961 replacement],
sections 351-361}. This cause of action - implied easement- is entirely different from and wholly unrelated
to the prescriptive right cause of action set forth in the
first complaint. In fact, neither cause of action has a
main element in common with the other, though some of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the supporting elements are the same. A side by side
comparison will illustrate the difference:

Prescriptive Right

Implied Eascmc11f

(1) open, notorious
adverse use

( 1) single ov.rnershi p

(2) in excess of twenty
years

(3) apparent, visible prior
use over long period

( 3) of a continuous and
uninterrupted nature

( 4) reasonable necessity to
beneficial enjoyment
of dominant estate

(2) severance

The test as to whether a second suit is barred Is
whether it asserts the same cause of action as that on
which a judgment has been previously entered. And
whether a cause of action is the same as a prior one turns
on whether the evidence necessary to prove it would have
proved the first one. In this case the causes of action
have very little in common; in fact, proof of the second
precludes proof of the first. They are incompatible.
Thus, plaintiffs' second suit and the cause of the action
therein alleged come squarely within the rules hereinabove set forth.
It is noteworthy that at the time the trial court
denied plaintiffs' motion for a new trial in the first suit,
plaintiffs were out of court on a summary judgment
against them. The motion for new trial was an attempt
to get back in court so that the pleadings could be amended and the implied easement cause of action be presented
to the court. The court denied the motion, for reasons not
known. All that is known is that the court refused to

12
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pass on the question of implied easement, on the merits.
This court has heretofore stated that a judgment is not
res judicata as to matters which a court expressly refuses
to determine, Todaro v. Gardner, 3 U. 2d 404, 285 P. 2d
839, at 841 (1955).
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint in the second suit, since it states an entirely new
and independent cause of action against defendants. No
court has yet passed on plaintiffs' claim there asserted,
and they are entitled to their day in court.
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
BEAN AND BEAN
K. RoGER BEAN
50 North Main Street
Layton, Utah
Attorneys for Pla.intiffs
and A. ppellatn.ts

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13

